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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellants, co-owners of a garden and 
swimming pool supply store in Ogden, Utah, ap-
peal from a jury verdict on special interrogatories 
in favor of the respondents for damages allegedly 
sustained as the result of the plaintiff Brent Wheeler 
walking through a glass door on the premises leased 
by the defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The plaintiff by and through his guardian ad 
litem filed suit in the District Court of Weber 
1 
County against the defendants for injuries allegedly 
sustained when he walked through a glass sliding 
door on the premises leased by the defendants. The 
plaintiff Arlene Turley, the guardian ad litem and 
mother of the respondent Brent Wheeler, sought 
damages for the special expenditures which she 
made on behalf of her son as a result of the acci-
dent. The case was tried on the 16th day of Decem-
ber, 1965 on jury trial before the Honorable John 
F. Wahlquist, Judge. The matter was submitted to 
the jury on special interrogatories. The jury deter-
mined that the defendants were negligent in fail-
ing to maintain glass of sufficient strength in the 
door involved to have prevented the accident which 
negligence the jury found to be the proximate cause 
of the respondent's damages. Subsequent to the 
jury's verdict, a motion for new trial was filed by 
the appellants which was denied by the trial judge 
upon condition that the respondents accept the re-
duction in the verdict of 5 per cent. The respond-
ents accepted the reduction, and the appellants filed 
their appeal to this court from the judgment en-
tered on the verdict. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants submit that the trial court com-
mitted serious and prejudicial error at the time of 
trial and that the evidence warrants reversal as 
a matter of law. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The appellants submit the following Statement 
of Facts. The appellants, father and son, were in 
1963 operating a business in Ogden, Utah known 
as Sunplay Pool & Garden Center (T-p. 119). The 
real property where the Sunplay business was being 
conducted was owned by a Dr. Naisbitt (T-120). 
There was a building and a swimming pool on the 
premises and the appellants had taken a lease from 
Dr. Naisbitt of the property which had previously 
been under lease to a Mr. Claude Huss (T-120-121). 
The lease that Mr. Huss had previously had was 
relinquished and the appellants took over the re-
maining portion of Mr. Huss' lease and also execut-
ed a new lease with Dr. Naisbitt. The business was 
principally a garden and swimming pool supply 
business ( R-121). According to Mr. Charles R. 
Jones, the premises were in approximately the same 
condition at the time of the respondent Wheeler's 
accident as when the appellants leased the pre-
mises (T-122). 
The appellants on an appointment basis would 
allow children to use their swimming pool, which 
was maintained for display purposes and to assist 
in the appellants' business of selling swimming pools 
and swimming pool supplies. Children were allowed 
to swim in the pool on the basis of 20¢ for a two 
hour period (T-94, 130). The appellants never al-
lowed more than 12 children to use the pool at any 
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one time (T-131). The appellants employed a Mr. 
Jam es Hill to assist in the maintenance of the prop-
erty and to act as a lifeguard (T-158, 160). On the 
day in question, the appellants had also employed 
a Mr. Dennis Ball, who worked on a part-time basis 
taking care of the pool along with Mr. Hill (T-147). 
The premises consisted of a double chain link fence, 
swimming pool and a building, where the appel-
lants kept their equipment and supplies, which was 
immediately adjacent to the pool. Appellants also 
had candy in the building adjacent to the pool which 
they sold to the children using the pool (T-172, 
165). 
On August 21, 1963, Brent Wheeler, who was 
then 12 years of age and who had been to the pool 
approximately three times before in 1963, made 
reservations to swim in appellants' pool from 12 
noon to 2: 00 p.m. ( T-92-93). The respondent, Brent 
Wheeler, and four of his friends paid the appellants 
20¢ for the use of the pool and started to swim. 
Prior to entering the pool, Brent entered through 
the sliding glass door into the outside area of the 
pool. After swiming for awhile, he went back into 
the building to check the time. He re-entered the 
building through the same door which was later 
involved in the acident (T-95). He stated that the 
door had been all the way open at the time he had 
first entered the building to pay his 20¢ and to go 
into the pool area. He stated that when he went in 
to check the time, he observed the door had been 
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closed part way ( T-95). According to Brent, he 
looked at the clock over by the cash register in the 
building. He testified ( T-96) : 
"Q. Okay. What did you do after you 
saw what time it was? 
"A. I reset my watch and turned 
around and looked through the door and I 
walked,and I looked through it again and hit 
the glass. 
"Q. Okay. Now, when you turned 
around the first time and looked, what did 
you see? 
"A. Just the bar with two sides is all. I 
didn't see anything on either side of it." 
According to the respondent Wheeler's testimony, he 
looked at the door when he was approximately 10 
feet away, then looked at his watch, again looked 
at the door when he was approximately 4 feet away, 
looked down and walked into the door (T-97). After 
bumping into the glass door Brent walked through 
the glass to a point approximately 4 feet beyond 
the door ( T-100). On cross-examination, he testified 
(T-110) 
"Q Oh, I'm sorry. You told us that. 
You looked at your watch and looked at the 
door and you were about ten feet away. Is 
that right? 
"A I Jooked before I started out. 
"Q You were about ten feet away. 
"A Yes. 
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1 'Q And then you say you looked down 
at your watch? 
"A Yes. 
"Q As you walked along? 
"A y es. 
"Q And that you looked again when you 
say you were four feet away? 
"A Yes. 
"Q And then you looked at your watch 
and continued walking. 
"A y es . 
. "Q As far as you know you didn't look 
again. 
"A Only the twice. 
"Q Only the twice. I take it you hadn't 
gotten your clothes at that time. They were 
still out by the pool? 
"A Yes." 
As a result of the collision with the door, the glass 
broke and Brent Wheeler sustained cuts to his arms 
and legs necessitating medical treatment and hos-
pi taliza ti on. 
Brent Wheeler testified that there was no decal 
or other metal stripping on the glass at the time 
he walked into the door. Mr. Charles R. Jones testi-
fied that he didn't recall whether there was a decal 
on the day of the accident ( T-125) but that he had 
previously placed a decal on the door near the handle 
approximately 4 feet from the ground. The decal 
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was a large transparent yellow and blue decal 8 
to 10 inches in diameter (T-124). Presence of the 
decal in the past was corroborated by Mr. Dennis 
Jones (T-143-144). It was admitted that there was 
no divider bar or metal tape on the door. Mr. James 
Hill testified that when he cleaned up the glass he 
picked up a large piece of glass which was connected 
to a small piece by a piece of paper or other sub-
stance which could have been a decal ( T-168). He 
also indicated that he recalled a decal on the glass 
sometime before the accident, but he couldn't speci-
fically say whether it was there at the time of the 
accident (T-168-169). Mrs. Lea Jones, the wife and 
mother of the appellants, testified that she cleaned 
the glass doors on the Sunday immediately before 
the accident ( T-181). She stated at that time there 
was a decal on the sliding door half way up in the 
center near the handle ( T-182). She stated this is 
the only time she cleaned the windows and that 
she had a specific recollection of the decal ( R-182-
189). Dennis Ball indicated that he had a clear 
recollection of having seen the decal prlor to the 
accident but could'nt say for certain whether it was 
there on that day (R-150). 
The deep end of the pool was located near the 
door swimmers jumping into the pool would slash 
water on the door leaving water marks which could 
be observed by a person looking through the door. 
Mr. Ralph Hill testified that subsequent to the 
accident, while he was giving first aid to the re-
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spondent Brent Wheeler, that the boy had a jaw-
breaker in his cheek and he told him to spit it out 
and the respondent Brent Wheeler did so (T-165). 
The Wheeler boy denied that he had a jawbreaker 
(T-192) although this candy was sold at the Sun-
play premises. 
Bert D. Vandenberg, manager of the glass 
division of Bennett Glass and Paint in Ogden, testi-
fied that the glass in the door was replaced with 
3/16th inch sheet glass and that replacement of 
broken glass is usually with the same size and 
quality glass as was previously in the door. Mr. 
Vandenberg indicated that other glass available 
would be safety glass with wire, tempered safety 
glass, or safety glass with a plastic inner-lining (T-
40). Over objection, he was allowed to testify as 
to the use of tempered glass in schools and as to 
what the F.H.A. standard, as respects commercial 
construction, was at the time of the trial (T-43-44). 
He also testified as to the type of glass used in L.D.S. 
churches in the community ( T -44) . Mr. V anden-
berg indicated that tempered glass would have had 
to have been specially ordered and that ordinary 
glass would not rupture unless it was exposed to 
a pressure of 6,000 pounds of square inch whereas 
tempered glass could withstand 30,000 pounds p.s.i. 
( T-48). On cross-examination, Mr. Vandenberg ac-
knowledged that the F.H.A. specifications applied 
only to new buildings and remodeling and had no 
application to existing structures ( T-49). He in-
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clicated that the g1·eat majority of installations, ap-
proximately 95 per cent, had 3/16ths inch glass (T-
50). He stated that the only way an individual could 
tell the difference between safety glass which was 
tempered and the normal 3/16ths inch plate glass 
would be by nipple marks which would appear near 
the edge of the tempered glass caused as the glass 
was handled during the tempering process and that 
this would require some knowledge of the factory 
processing of safety glass (T-51). 
The case was submitted to the jury on special 
interrogatories. The jury returned a verdict, finding 
that the defendants were generally negligent but 
that they were not negligent in failure to have ap-
propriate metal strips or a decal on the door but 
in failing to have glass of sufficient strength which 
would withstand ordinary bumping without break-
ing or which would remain intact after breaking. 
(T-226). The jury indicated that the failure to have 
a metal guard, decal or poster was "not proven" 
(T-226). The jury returned a verdict for $1,578.75 
special damages and $10,000.00 general damages. 
The submission of the special interrogatories in the 
fonn submitted was accepted to by the appellants as 
were certain of the court's instructions. The conten-
tion that the court erred in giving certain instruc-
tions will be canvassed in detail in the Argument 
portion of the brief. The final judgment as entered 
by the court was for the above mentioned special 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
THAT THE RESPONDENT BRENT WHEELER WAS 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
The appellants contend that the trial court erred 
in not granting the appellants motion for directed 
verdict at the end of the evidence on the grounds 
that the plaintiff Brent Wheeler was in fact con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law. 
The apellants are of course aware that in ap-
praising the facts on appeal, they must be taken in 
a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. How-
ever, the facts when viewed in this case clearly 
evidence as against the applicable legal rule, the 
conclusion that respondent Brent Wheeler was negli-
gent as a matter of law. Several facts are directly 
relevant to the contention of the appellants. First, 
it should be noted that the jury did not find that 
there was any negligence on the part of the appel-
lants in failing to place decals or other markings 
upon the glass door which the respondent struck 
which contributed to his injuries. The testimony 
in this regard clearly discloses that the door was 
adequately marked. Mr. Charles R. Jones testified 
that to his knowledge there had been a decal upon 
the door. At one time, it had been removed and re-
placed with another more observable decal. Although 
he did not recall a decal on the door on the day of 
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the accident, his last specific recollection of the con-
dition of the door was that it was adequately marked 
\\·ith the decal. Mr. Jones' observation was co1To-
blil'ated by his son, l\fr. Dennis Jones, a co-owner and 
operator of the Sunplay activity. l\fr. Dennis Ball 
couldn't say if there was a decal on the door on the 
exact day of the accident but did recall seeing a 
decal on the door sometime immediately prior to the 
alleged injury. Mr. James Hill, an employee of the 
apellants, testified that in cleaning up the glass, he 
picked up a piece of glass that appeared to be at-
tached to another piece of glass that clearly could 
have been a decal or other marking. Further, Mr. 
Hill had no distinct recollection of a decal being on 
the door sometime prior to the time of the accident . 
.Mrs. Lea Jones expressly recalled and rather defi-
nitely testifed that the decal did exist on the door 
the Sunday prior to the time the accident occurred. 
In addition to the testimony concerning the decal, 
there was evidence to the effect that the pool had 
been available for swimming at least two days im-
mediately prior to the time of the accident and that 
because the deep end of the pool was nearest the 
door that often during the course of the use of the 
pool water was splashed upon the sliding door leav-
ing visible water marks. This evidence, coupled 
with the jury's conclusion that the absence of a decal 
or metal stripping in no way contributed to the 
accident, lends to the conclusion that there was no 
negligence on the part of the appellants in failing 
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to maintain the premises in such a manner, that 
had the respondent Brent Wheeler observed what 
was reasonably subject to observation the accident 
would have been avoided. 
In addition, the evidence clearly seemed to sup-
port the inference that the respondent Brent Wheeler, 
who was injured as the result of his walking into the 
glass, sustained the injury as a result of his own 
activities. The conclusion is supported by the re-
spondent's own testimony that he had been upon the 
premises on at least three prior occasions. Conse-
quently, it must be concluded that there was at least 
some familiarity with the general layout of the pre-
mises and the nature of the physical structure of the 
Sunplay operation. On the day in question, Brent 
Wheeler had entered the premises, gone through the 
glass door and particularly observed that the glass 
door was open. He thereafter swam and re-entered 
the building adjacent to the pool in order to deter-
mine the time. Again his recollection was specific 
as to the position of the door. His testimony was that 
at that time the door had been partially closed. 
He observed the clock and approximately 10 feet 
from the clock on the inside of the door, looked to 
the door, glanced down, looked at his watch, again 
observed the door and then walked directly into the 
door. There was nothing to indicate the door was 
in disrepair and the jury's determination that the 
condition of the door in no way contributed to the 
cguse of the accident, viz-a-viz decal or other mark-
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ings, clearly evidences that the injuries of Brent 
\Vheeler were directly the result of his failure to 
keep an appropriate lookout and thus his own negli-
gence. Other facts of record support the conclusion 
that Brent \i\Theeler was in fact failing to observe 
dangers that might have caused the accident as a re-
sult of his own wrongdoing. The boy acknowledged 
that the store sold candy as did the proprietors of 
the Sun play Pool activity. Mr. James Hill indicated 
that in the course of administering first aid that the 
respondent Brent Wheeler had a jawbreaker in his 
mouth which he told him to spit out and that Brent 
\Vheeler did so. The store sold such candy and there 
was no evidence that the Wheeler boy purchased 
any of the candy available for sale by the store. 
The conclusion is obvious that the young Wheeler 
boy, whether he entered the premises for the pur-
pose of checking the clock or not, took a piece of 
candy and in his effort to avoid detection, failed to 
observe the glass door which was otherwise ade-
quately marked and if he had used reasonable cau-
tion on his own behalf would have been obvious and 
the acident avoided. There is absolutely no evidence 
that the actions of the appellants were the sole and 
proximate cause of the acident. Under similar cir-
cumstances, the case law is overwhelming to the 
effect that as a matter of law the respondent, Brent 
\Vheeler, was contributorily negligent. All the testi-
mony which appears of record, other than that of 
the respondent Brent Wheeler was to the effect 
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that a decal was in fact upon the glass approxim-
ately 4 feet high near the handle of the door. The 
jury in finding that the absence of any markings 
was not a contributory cause to the accident obvi-
ously determined that Brent's testimony was not 
to be believed to the extent that he indicated 
there was no decal on the door at the time he struck 
it. In support of this conclusion, the testimony of 
Brent Wheeler is itself dispository since he appar-
ently was not observing the glass at the time he 
walked in to it. 
In Rosenberg v. Hartman, 313 Mass. 54, 46 
N.E.2d 406 (1943), the court held that where the 
plaintiff, a customer of the defendant's store, en-
tered an open door which in the meantime had 
been closed and where there was no indication of 
any defect in the door and where it was possible 
from a construction of the evidence that there were 
fittings on the door which he should have observed 
where the plaintiff struck the door walking through 
it sustaining injuries, there was no evidence of 
negligence on the part of the defendant. In the in-
stant case, there is not only evidence of a decal on 
the door, there is also evidence of a sign, adjacent 
to the sliding door portion which should have been 
visible, and if Mrs. Jones' testimony is to be be-
lieved, the sign was on the sliding portion of the 
door1. In addition, a water slide was partially pro-
truding across the sliding portion of the door which 
1 The sign apparently had the phone numbers where the propri· 
etors of the Sunplay activity could be reached. 
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should have given any observant person an oppor-
tunity to see the door and avoid danger. The Rosen-
berg case is cited not necessarily for the proposi-
tion that the appellant was not negligent but for 
the proposition that under the particular circum-
stances of the case, there could be no finding that 
the activity of the appellants was the sole and proxi-
mate cause of the respondent Brent Wheeler's in-
JUry. 
In similar circumstances, in the case of Flynn 
i·. F. W. Woolworth Co., 155 N.E. 2d 176 (Mass. 
1959), the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of 
Massachusetts again found that where the plaintiff 
sustained injuries while walking through a glass 
door in no particular hurry and with knowledge of 
the existence of the door, there could be no finding 
in favor of the plaintiff. This case, when taken in 
conjunction with the Rosenberg decision, indicat-
ing that glass doors are a relatively common occur-
rence or everyday experience which a reasonably 
observant person would be aware of or should anti-
cipate, indicates that the accident in the present 
case was the direct and proximate result of the acti-
vity of the respondent. A similar result was reached 
by our sister state in the case of Home Public Mar-
ket v. Newrock, 111 Colo. 428, 142 P.2d 272 (1943). 
In Crawford v. Given Bros., 318 S.W.2d 123 
(Tex. 1958), the court held that where a seven year 
old boy, a patron of the defendants' store, struck 
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a glass panel and sustained injuries, a judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff would be set aside on the 
grounds that the design of the building and other 
accommodations did not demonstrate any architec-
turally unsound or unsafe activity and that no duty 
was owed to maintain any special type of warning. 
In Dukek v. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 248 
Minn. 374, 80 N.W.2d 53 (1956), the court ruled 
that the defendant, a Western Union messsenger 
boy, in a suit against a store owner for injuries 
sustained when the boy walked into a glass panel, 
was contributorily negligent. The facts indicate cir-
cumstances substantially comparable to those in the 
instant case. The court noted that there was noth-
ing particular about the construction to distract the 
plaintiff and nothing to prevent his seeing the door 
and distinguishing the doors from the adjacent 
panel. The court concluded that it was inescapable 
that the plaintiff received his injuries as the result 
of failure to observe the direction in which he was 
moving. Similar conclusions were reached by the 
Texas court in A. C. Burton v. Stansy, 223 S.W.2d 
310 (Tex. 1949) and Acme Laundry Co. v. Ford, 
284 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1955). 
In Pettigrew v. Nite-Cap, Inc., 63 So.2d 492 
( 1953 Fla.), the trial court directed the verdict in 
favor of the defendant. On appeal, the determination 
was affirmed. The plaintiff walked into a large 
plate glass door at the entrance to the defendant's 
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restaurant. It was alleged that the glass was color-
less, void of markings or handles or other visible 
objects. A situation more extreme than this case. 
The appellate court noted that the door was of clear 
glass but that there was a wide metal strip on the 
top and bottom of the door. Black knobs were placed 
in a convenient area for the movement of the door. 
The court indicated that the sole and proximate 
cause of the injury was the failure of the plaintiff 
to see that which by exercise of reasonable care she 
could have seen. This case is presented to the Court 
for the proposition that, under the facts of the in-
stant case where there were observable markings 
and where the testimony of the injured party him-
self indicated that he failed to keep a reasonable 
lookout warrants a determination that the respon-
dent Brent Wheeler was contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law. 
A result very comparable was reached in Stone 
v. Hotel Seville, Inc., 104 So. 2d 847 (Fla. App. 
1958). The California Court of Appeals reached a 
similar conclusion in Maidman v. Metropolitan Trad-
ing Co., 166 Cal.App.2d 205, 332 P.2d 807 ( 1958) 
where the plaintiff struck a large heavy plate door. 
See also, Brand v. Pope, 103 Ga.App. 489, 119 S.E. 
2d 723 ( 1961), where the court sustained a motion to 
dismiss by the defendant in an action by a social 
guest for damages as the result of an injury sus-
tained in walking into a sliding glass door. 
17 
It is aclmittecl that there may be cases where 
a contrary result has been reached (a) upon the 
contention that through the facts of the particular 
case a jury question was presented on the basis of 
contributory negligence. However those cases seem 
to clearly be based upon a failure of the proprietor 
of the premises to place decals or other warning 
signs in the vicinity of the door or upon the failure 
of the premises to have other objects which would 
attract the attention of the injured person to the 
danger involved. In this particular case, the jury 
expressly found that the contention of the plaintiff 
that the failure to have appropriate markings or 
objects which would attract the attention of the in-
jured party to the danger was "not proven". Other 
cases which support the contention of the appellants 
under comparable circumstances are Bryant v. L11-
dendi Roller Drome, Inc., 150 So.2d 55 (La. App. 
1963) ; Brown v. Alabama Foods Incorporated, 190 
Atl.2d 257 (Dist. Columbia Appeals applying Mary-
land law). In the latter case, the District of Colum-
bia Appellant Court noted that a super market cus-
tomer injured as the result of striking a glass panel 
and who was familiar with the premises was negli-
gent as a matter of law. The same situation is clearly 
sustained by the testimony of the respondent Brent 
\Vheeler in the instant case. 
Based upon the evidence taken in a light most 
favorable to the respondent, Brent \Vheeler, and 
parti~ularly with reference to his own testimony it 
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rs cleal' that the accident occul'l'ecl as the direct 
result of the contributory negligence of Brent in 
failing to keep a proper lookout for his own safety, 
failing to observe what was obse1·vable, and in fail-
ing to exercise the reasonable care which a prudent 
boy under the same or similar circumstances would 
haYe exercised. 
It may be that in an appropriate case, the facts 
would indicate that the striking of a glass door by 
a young child would present a jury question and 
that it would be improper for an appellate court to 
overturn the jury's determination. However, in this 
case, the jury expressly found the failure to have 
markings or decals in a place observable by the in-
jured person was not a cause of the accident. It is, 
of course, acknowledged that the jury determined 
that the acivities of Brent Wheeler were not a con-
tributing cause to the accident, however this clearly 
ignores the undisputed factual testimony from the 
mouth of the respondent himself. It is submitted 
that, in the absence of a legislative determination 
that compensation should be awarded in cases com-
parable to the instant one, this Court is duty bound 
to reverse. Many cases from this Court support a 
conclusion that the failure of Brent \Vheeler to ob-
serve the glass door renders him contributorily 
negligent. These cases are relevant to Point III of 
this Brief and are therefore discussed under that 
point to avoid duplication. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING IN-
TERROGATORIES TO THE JURY WHICH WOULD 
ALLOW THE JURY TO FIND THAT THE APPEL-
LANTS WERE NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO HAVE 
GLASS IN THE SLIDING DOOR ON THE PREMISES, 
LEASED BY THE APPELLANTS, OF SUCH A 
STRENGTH THAT NO INJURY COULD HAVE OC-
CURRED TO THE RESPONDENT BRENT WHEELER 
vYHEN HE STRUCK THE DOOR, SINCE UNDER THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE, (A) THE EVIDENCE DID NOT 
JUSTIFY SUCH AN INSTRUCTION; (B) THE IM-
POSITION OF SUCH A BURDEN UPON THE APPEL-
LANTS EXCEEDED THE USUAL STANDARD OF 
CARE REQUIRED OF THE OCCUPIER OF PREMISES 
ALLOWING THE PREMISES TO BE USED BY BUSI-
NESS INVITEES; (C) THE INTERROGATORY PRE-
SENTED TO THE JURY A STANDARD INAPPRO-
PRIATE TO THE FACTS OF THIS INSTANT CASE. 
The basis upon which the jury determined that 
the appellants were negligent and that the respon-
dents should recover is set forth on page 226 of the 
record. The jury determined that the appellants 
were negligent "in maintaining a glass of a thick-
ness or a type in the sliding door in question in-
sufficient to withstand ordinary bumping without 
breaking or which would remain intact after break-
ing." 
An exception to the court's submission of the 
special interrogatory was taken by the appellants on 
the grounds that the interrogatory given by the court 
on the issue of the thickness of the glass was mis-
leading (T-199, 200). 
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There was no evidence introduced to show that 
the "thickness" of the glass in the sliding door on 
the premises maintained by the appellants was not 
sufficient. The glass was 3/16ths inch thick. No 
testi11wny on the "thickness" issue was offered. The 
testimony of the respondents' expert, Mr. Burt D. 
Vandenberg, was to the effect that other safety 
glass which is sometimes used in sliding doors was 
of approximately the same thickness but would either 
be tempered or inmeshed with wire or supported 
by plastic innerplate. The testimony given by Mr. 
Vandenberg was to the effect that tempered glass 
was used in schools in the area, and was required 
by F.H.A. standards subsequent to the time the 
building occupied by the appellants was built. Also 
evidence was offered that some L.D.S. churches re-
quired tempered doors. Assuming the admissibility 
of such evidence, there is no showing that this re-
lated to the particular building in question or that 
the glass in the building, 3/16th inch, was not other-
wise adequate. In fact, the testimony of Mr. Van-
denberg was that 95 per cent of the glass installed 
in the community was 3/16th inch glass was not 
safety glass. His testimony was to the effect that 
3/16th inch glass would withstand pressure of up to 
6,000 pounds per square inch. There was no evidence 
that a structural strength of up to 6,000 pounds per 
square inch was not adequate to protect against 
"ordinary bumping". In addition, even though there 
was testimony to the effect that tempered glass 
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would withstand a pressure of 30,000 pounds per 
square inch, there was no evidence as to the effect 
of ordinary bumping on glass so that a force 
30,000 pounds per square inch could be concluded 
to actually protect against the impact which occurred 
in the instant case. 
Of extreme importance is the fact that the 
only way an individual could tell whether safety 
glass or normal 3/16th inch glass had been placed 
in the sliding door which the respondent Brent 
Wheeler struck would be by observation of tiny little 
nipple marks which would have been placed upon 
the glass during the tempering process. This requir-
ed expert know ledge ( T-51) . 
In Quinn v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 42 Utah 113, 
129 P. 362 (1912), this Court indicated, speaking 
of the duty of a business invitee: 
"It was its duty to exercise ordinary care and 
diligence to provide and maintain a reason-
ably safe place for ingress and egress to and 
from its place of business for its customers, 
and to exercise the same degree of care and 
diligence to prevent injury to them and to 
their property while they were lawfully in 
its place of business or on its premises. Ap-
pellant, however, was not an insurer of the 
safety of its customers; nor was it required 
to avoid all accidents; either to them or to 
their property, at its peril. The respondent, 
therefore, was required to show that appel-
lant in some way had omitted to exercise that 
degree of care and diligence for her safety 
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stated above 1 and that by reason of such want 
of care [her injury occurred]." 
In the Quinn case, this Court reversed a judgment 
for a woman who had sustained damage to her 
dress as a result of spilled ink while upon the pre-
mises of the appellant paying a bill. The Court de-
termined that there was no showing of sufficient 
negligence to warrant jury returning the verdict 
returned. The Court also concluded a more rigorous 
standard was not in accord with the state of the 
law. 
In Winterowd v. Christensen, 68 Utah 546, 
251 P. 360 ( 1926), this Court stated with reference 
to the standard of care owed by the owner or occu-
pant of presmises to a business invitee: 
"* * * It is well settled that the owner or oc-
cupant of premises who induces others to 
come upon it by invitation express or implied 
owes to them the duty of using reasonable or 
ordinary care to keep the premises in safe 
and suitable condition, so that they will not 
be unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to 
danger." 
Recently, in DeWeese v. J. C. Penney Co., 5 
Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (1956), this Court again 
acknowledged that store owners are not insurers 
of the safety of their patrons. The Court indicated 
that the standard of care to be applied was that 
only of ordinary and reasonable care under the 
circumstances. This Court stated: 
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"Th~ essen~ial inquiry relating to defendant's 
negligence is whether in performing its duty 
of due care just recited, it knew or should have 
known, that a dangerous condition existed 
and whether sufficient time elapsed there-
after that, in due care, it should have [ cor-
rected the problem]." 
There is, of course, no doubt that the respon-
dent B1·ent Wheeler was a business invitee on the 
premises of the appellants, In re Winimers Estate, 
111 Utah 444, 182 P.2d 119 ( 1947). However, that 
does not, based upon the above cases, require the 
invitor to exercise other than ordinary care for the 
safety of his patrons. He does not become an in-
surer of his premises, nor is he required to be put 
to excessive or unreasonable burdens in determining 
that the premises are safe for the invitee. Prosser, 
Torts, 3rd Edition, p. 403, states: 
"On the other hand there is no liability for 
harm resulting from conditions from which 
no unreasonable risk was to be anticipated 
or those which the occupier did not know and 
could not have discovered with reasonable 
care. The mere existence of a defect or danger 
is not enough to establish liability unless it 
is shown to be of such a character or of such 
duration that the jury may reasonably con-
clude that due care would have discovered it." 
The alleged defect claimed to constitute negli-
gence in this case was the failure to maintain glass 
of sufficient strength to have prevented the injury. 
However, only an expert could have determined that 
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the glass panel on the premises of the appellants 
was not safety glass. Further, the glass on the pre-
mises of the appellants was used in 95 per cent 
of the glass installations in the community. Addi-
tionally, it should be noted that it was marked with 
a decal or at least the jury found that the absence 
of warning in no way caused the accident. Under 
these circumstances, it would seem that the appel-
lants met their duty of ordinary and reasonable 
ca1·e and that the court erred in instructing the 
jury that they could find negligence from the failure 
to maintain glass of sufficient thickness or type 
as to have prevented the injury. The instruction 
given by the court on the standard of care required 
of a business invitee (Instruction No. 17) was suffi-
cient to appraise the jury of the required standard. 
However, when the court expressly called to the 
jury's attention to the contention of inadequacy of 
the thickness or type of glass, it was stating to 
the jury that this was a requirement that the ap-
pellants must satisfy in order to meet their duty 
as an owner and occupier of premises where busi-
ness invitees were entertained. Such a determination 
was one for the jury. The jury must affix the stan-
dm·d of care under the circumstances of this case 
and based upon the standard above mentioned (that 
the owner and occupier of premises need only use 
onlina1·y care) the trial court's interrogatory to the 
jm·y as to whether negligence could be found from 
the composition and type of glass was clearly error 
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since it imposed a greater burden than that as a 
matter of law. Consequently ,the action of the court 
requires reversal. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS CONTEND THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS 10 AND 11. 
Instruction No. 10 requested by the appellants 
read: 
"You are instructed that Brent Wheeler was 
under a duty to exercise that degree of care 
for his own safety which would ordinarily be 
exercised by an ordinarily prudent boy of the 
same age, capacity and experience, and in de-
termining whether or not he met the standard 
of care for his own safety, you are instructed 
that he is charged with observing what was 
there to be seen." 
The trial court ref used the requested instruction 
underlining the words "observing what was there 
to be seen" and writing "not proper" underneath. 
Requested Instruction No. 11 read : 
"Generally, human experience justifies the 
inference that when one looks in the direction 
of an object clearly visible he sees it. When 
there is evidence to the effect that one did 
look, but did not see that which was in plain 
sight, it follows that either some part of sue? 
evidence is untrue or the person was negli-
gently inattentive." 
The trial court stated that the instruction was not 
given indicating on the instruction "situation not 
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as on highway, jury question, swimmers eyes may 
be wet, etc. Children do not drive cars but do swim 
' etc." An examination of the instructions given by 
the court reveals that in no way was the jury in-
structed that the respondent Brent Wheeler had an 
obligation to keep a proper lookout for his own safe-
ty and to observe objects which were reasonably 
visible. 
It should be remembered that the facts in this 
case were to the effect that the Wheeler boy had 
gone through the sliding door out into the pool 
area to swim. He had come back in through the 
door, observed its condition and then set his watch, 
looked in the vicinity of the door twice and walked 
directly into the door. In addition, he had been on 
the premises approximately three times previous 
that year and was familiar with the location of the 
door in the building. The comments of the court to 
the effect that water could have been in the boy's 
eyes from swimming have no relationship to the 
facts of this case. Not one scintillia of evidence was 
presented that at the time of the accident the boy 
was suffering from any visual defect as the result 
of having left the swimming pool. In fact, the boy's 
own testimony was to the effect that he had ob-
tained his watch from the clothes of his swimming 
companion and walked into the building, observed 
the clock, set his watch and walked out striking 
the glass door. At no time did he indicate that his 
vision was in any way obscured because of his hav-
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It is submitted that the failure of the trial 
c<mrt t() gi \·e the requested instructions 1 IJ and 11 ef-
focti \·ely depri\·ed the appellants of presenting their 
thf~<1ry rJf the law of the case to the jury. The comt 
did instruct upon contributory negligence but left 
that phrase \Vithout any substance 01· meaning. Par-
ticular C(Jnduct that would constitute contributory 
negligence was not definith·ely spelled out to the 
jury. It was, of course, the theory of the appellants 
that the respondent Brent \\-heller \vas contribu-
torily negligent because of his failure to obserw 
thf~ door which he struck, when the door "\vas in such 
a p<Jsition with relation to objects in the store and 
the decal on the door that he was negligent in not 
observing it. 
In Manning v. Powers, 117 Utah 310, 215 P.2d 
:rn6 ( 1950), an action was brought by the father 
of a deceased child f01· the wrongful death of his 
child when the child while riding a bicycle was 
struck by the defendant's automobile. The trial 
court instructed the jury with reference to the pos-
sible contributory negligence of the deceased that: 
"The age, capacity and experience of the said 
[deceased] are factors which you may take 
into consideration together with all the evi-
dence in the case in determining whether or 
not the defendant was negligent, so far as 
such factors were known to or in the exercise 
of ordinary care could have been seen by the 
defendant or the [deceased] was contribu-
torily negligent. . . ." 
This Court ruled that the trial court had acted pro-
perly in giving such an instruction. Thus, this Court 
in a case involving the death of a child correctly in-
(_licated that the child himself had an obligation to 
kc,ep a proper lookout for his own safety. 
In Mingus v. Olsson, 115 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 
495 (1949), this Court imposed the duty on not 
only a motorist to make more than a mere glance 
to determine if a pedestrian was in danger, who was 
crossing a street in the face of an approaching ve-
hicle, but indicated also that the pedestrian who 
undertakes to cross a busy street without first ob-
sen·ing the vehicular traffic may be guilty of con-
tributory negligence in failing to observe approach-
ing vehicles. 
Consequently, this Court has recognized that in 
the case of pedestrians, or children, bicyclists and 
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motorists, there is an obligation on the part of in-
dividuals to keep a reasonable and proper lookout 
for their own safety. There is no legitimate reason 
why this should not be applied in other instances, 
especially as in the instant case where the respon-
dent Brent Wheeler had in fact been on the pre-
mises, knew the position of the door and could 
with reasonable caution, had he kept a proper look-
out, have avoided the accident which resulted in his 
InJUry. 
In Eisner v. Salt Lake City, 120 Utah 675, 238 
P.2d 416 ( 1951), this Court held that there could 
be no excuse for a woman not noticing a depres-
sion in the sidewalk which she stepped into merely 
because there were a large group of children pass-
ing at the time which might have distracted her. 
Her forgetfulness was held to constitute contrib-
utory negligence. 
In Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 
81, 395 P.2d 918 ( 1964), summary judgment was 
granted on the ground of contributory negligence 
against a truckdriver delivering merchandise to 
the defendant's department store who was directed 
to go downstairs and out a door to return to his 
truck, where he went to the first door he saw, 
opened it and stepped off backward into an elevator 
shaft. This Court stated: 
"In order to justify holding that a jury ques-
tion as to negligence exists, where injury has 
resulted from an observable hazard, it is es-
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sential that there be something which could 
be regarded as tending to distract the plain-
tiff's attention or to prevent him from seeing 
the danger thus providing some reasonable 
basis for a finding that even though he exer-
cised due care he could be excused from see-
ing and avoiding it." 
This Court has recognized the necessity on the 
part of an individual in circumstances other than 
automobile cases to exercise due regard for his own 
care and to observe hazards which would normally 
be observed by maintaining reasonable attention. 
In Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande Wes tern Rail-
road Co., 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751 ( 1964), 
this Court stated: 
"Where the hazardous condition is as easily 
observable to the invitee as it is to the owner, 
the duty to warn does not exist, Lindsy v. 
Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d 
477; DeWeese v. J.C. Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 
116, 297 P.2d 898, 65 A.L.R. 2d 399." 
In the instant case the decals were a warning 
to some extent. 
In Wightman v. Bettilyon's Inc., 15 Utah 2d 
200, 390 P.2d 120 ( 1964), this Court sustained 
summary judgment where a pedestrian, aware of 
conditions on a sidewalk that were encroached upon 
by high growing weeds and who had knowledge 
that there was a danger of tripping and falling, 
was held to have a duty to give heed to his own 
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safety by carefully avoiding entrapment of weeds. 
The Court stated: 
"Appellant was aware of the condition of the 
sidewalk and as a reasonably prudent person 
had knowledge that there was danger of trip-
ping and failing in traveling over such a 
walk. Since the danger was apparent and she 
was aware of it, the duty was hers to give 
heed to her own safety by carefully observing 
and avoiding entrapment by weeds * * *" 
It is submitted therefore that where the re-
spondent Brent Wheeler was aware of the glass door, 
and familiar with the premises, he had a duty to 
observe that which was observable for his own pro-
tection. Therefore, the trial court should have given 
the instruction requested by the appellants. Fur-
ther, many of the above cases support appellants' 
contention that Brent vVheeler was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law. As noted in Point I. 
This Court should reverse. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE ERRONEOUS RU~ 
INGS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE WHICH 
REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
The appellants submit that the trial court made 
ruling on the admissibility of certain evidence 
proffered by the respondents which require rever-
sal in the instant case. 
The respondents' witness, Mr. Burt D. Vanden-
berg, was asked on redirect examination (R-52): 
"Q Well, do you know how many 
people that had 3/16 inch glass in their glass 
doors put tape on the glass to draw attention 
to it? 
"THE COURT: 
the summer of 1963? 
He is talking about 
"Q Yes, in the community? 
"A I can't state percentages again, but 
in '63 it was becoming quite aware that these 
sliding glass doors were dangerous. 
"MR. BRANDT: Objection. I move to 
strike that as not responsive. 
"THE COUR'T: It may remain. The 
jury may give it whatever weight they think 
it is entitled to." 
It is submitted that the trial court committed serious 
error in allowing the respondents' witness to testi-
fy that sliding glass doors were dangerous. The 
question was the number of persons who were us-
ing metal stripping as a means of drawing atten-
tion to the doors. The dangerous condition of the 
doors that might have existed was not the question 
posed. Counsel for appellants made an immediate 
objection as soon as the nonresponsive answer was 
introduced. The objection was clearly proper since 
the testimony was merely a conclusion of the wit-
ness as to the danger or lack of danger from the 
type of door which was involved in the instant case. 
The aspect of danger was an issue for the jury to 
determine. The answer was merely a conclusion 
of the witness volunteered without reference to the 
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question asked. An immediate motion to strike was 
made at the first time that counsel could have acted. 
The trial court instead of granting the motion to 
strike and admonishing the jury to disregard the 
conclusions of the witness, indicated that the jury 
could give it whatever weight they thought it was 
entitled to. In view of the fact of Mr. Vanden-
berg's experience in the glass industry, the jury 
could have given his opinion, as to the possible 
dangers from these doors substantial weight. This 
was a conclusion the jury was not entitled to 
weigh because the opinion of Mr. Vandenberg as 
to safety standards was not asked nor was there 
any showing that he had any expertise in this area 
or that he was basing his conclusion on any factual 
data. This is not a case where an expert in safety 
is allowed to give his opinion as to some particular 
defect in a piece of equipment which may be directly 
relevant to the ultimate consideration of the jury. 
Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah 
2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 ( 1958) ; Annotation 62 
A.L.R. 2d, 1426. In the instant case, there was no 
indication that there was any particular defect in 
the door in question or sliding doors as such. The 
witness merely gave his opinion that sliding doors 
were becoming dangerous at the time the accident 
occurred. The aspect of danger depends not upon 
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any expertise but upon the conditions of use and 
many other factors other than the quality of glass 
in the door. It was apparent therefore that the trial 
court committed error in allowing the testimony of 
Mr. Vandenberg's opinion to be considered by the 
jury. See Phoenix v. Camfield, 97 Ariz. 316, 400 
P.2d 115 ( 1965) where the Arizona court ruled that 
the trial court properly refused to permit an ex-
pert to testify as to his opinion with regard to the 
danger of an intersection where the facts were such 
that the jury could easily draw its own conclusions 
as to any possible danger. Since the testimony al-
lowed to be considered by the jury went directly to 
the question of danger, and when this is appraised 
against the nature of the interrogatory submitted 
by the trial court on the condition of the glass, it is 
submitted that the action of the trial court consti-
tuted prejudicial error. 
Additionally, trial court allowed Mr. Vanden-
berg to testify as to what the "custom as far as 
schools are concerned, what type of glass is put in 
those doors that young people use" (R-42). Fur-
ther ( R-43) , the witness, Mr. Vandenberg, was al-
lowed to testify that F.H.A. construction required 
that some kind of attention be directed towards 
glass in the door. Objection ws properly taken to 
each of the questions. The court said ( R-44) : 
"You my answer the question and the jury 
may consider it as to the standards of the 
community." 
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The court expressly directed the witness not to 
tell the particular viewpoint but to state the re-
quirement. The question was then asked as to the 
custom of churches, and the witness was allowed 
to indicate that particularly L.D.S. churches re-
quired tempered glass to be placed in their doors. 
(R-44). 
All of the above questions and the answers were 
allowed over objection of counsel. No evidence at 
any time was offered to show comparable conditions 
between the schools, the doors, the number of indi-
viduals using the door or any facts which could be 
said to correspond to the instant fact situation. 
Further, the F.H.A. construction requirements were 
in no way pinpointed to any particular type of 
building or activity. Further, the reference to 
churches was equally without any foundation and 
the reference to the requirements of L.D.S. churches 
from the question of admissibility of the evidence 
had an inherent quality of prejudice about it. At the 
time of the appellants' motion for a new trial, the 
trial court's action in admitting into evidence the 
testimony here challeneged was discussed upon by 
the court. The court's Memorandum reads (R-17): 
"The first consideration arises because the 
court received evidence as to standards re-
quired by the FHA in the installation and con-
struction of sliding glass doors, and the cus-
tom and requirements in local school houses, 
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and customs and standards required in some 
local church construction, to-wit: The L.D.S. 
Church construction. 
"The authorities appear to be divided as 
to whether or not the specific standards of 
Government Agencies, school boards, or large 
church groups are admissible as evidence of 
th~ general standard of the community, or as 
evidence of general community recognition of 
inherent in sliding glass doors." 
It is interesting to note that the court apparently 
gave the evidence a better foundation in its Mem-
orandum Decision than it had actually received at 
the time of its proffer. First, standards of F.H.A. 
v,-e1'e not necessarily directed to the installation and 
construction of sliding glass doors. Further the stan-
dards were not in effect at the time appellants oc-
cupied the premises. The customs and standards of 
local church construction were not detailed as to 
the particular types of doors or the circumstances of 
installation. The court apparently failed to note the 
ob,rious hearsay objection to allowing the F.H.A. 
standards to be admitted into evidence. Certainly 
better foundation was required to be laid in order 
to make testimony comparable to that received by 
the court admissible. The extent of familiarity with 
the standards that the witness may have had was 
not even a subject of inquiry. The nature of the 
standard and their application to particular situa-
tions was further not clearly presented. Under these 
circumstances, it is obvious that the evidence should 
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not have been permitted. It is also interesting to 
note that the question ( T-42) as to the custom as 
far as schools although possibly responsive to a 
prior qusetion concerning schools around this area 
was not limited to the particular area nor was the 
answer apparently so limited. The question of F.H.A. 
construction was not tied in with the local stan-
dards. The reference to L.D.S. church construction 
did contain a reference to this locality but did not 
indicate any particular limits to the locality or what 
the term locality referenced. It seems to be rather 
well recognized that reference to a standard of care 
by reference to codes or standards of safety issued 
o~· sponsored by a governmental body or by volun-
tary asociations are not admissible. In, Proof of 
Facts, Salt Lake County Bar Association ( 1961), 
Habit And Custom, p. 15, it is stated: 
"Evidence of the conduct of others, under 
the same or similar circumstances, is incom-
petent to establish a standard of care because 
standard of care is fixed by the rule of sub-
s tan ti ve law. Therefore, the comparative con-
duct of others should not be permitted to in-
fringe upon the substantive law wherein the 
standard of care is measured by ordinary care 
or the lack of ordinary care. Brig ham Young 
University v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th 
Cir., 1941). * * * The court, in the Lillywhite 
case further stated that the jury must be ad-
monished that such evidence is proper only to 
show what precautions were generally taken 
in such cases - not to establish the standard 
of care imposed by law upon the defendant." 
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The above statement should be compared with the 
erroneous statement of the trial court made to the 
jury at the time of the admission of the evidence. 
The trial court stated (T-44) in ruling on objec-
tion to F.H.A. standards: 
"You may answer the question, and the jury 
may consider it as standards of the com-
m/unity." 
Thus the trial court seemed to advise the jury that 
they could consider the evidence as the actual stan-
dard to be imposed as distinct from merely evidence 
of the appropriate standard. Indeed, the court said 
the F.H.A. specifications could be considered as the 
standards of the community. Under these circum-
stances, the action of the trial court in admitting 
evidence without appropriate admonition to the jury 
as to the limited purpose to be served by the admis-
sion even under the most liberal theory, reversible 
error was committed. See also 75 A.L.R. 2d 778; 
Hercules Powder Co. v. DiSabatino, 188 Atl.2d 529 
Del. ( 1963); Darnell v. Panhandle Co-op. Ass'n. 175 
Neb. 40, 120 N.W.2d 278 (1963); Swaney v. Penden 
Steel Co., 259 N.C. 531, 131 S.E.2d 601. It is recog-
nized that in some instances testimony as to compar-
able construction practices is admissible to show a 
particular standard in the community. Prosser, 
Torts, 3rd Edition, p. 160. However, there must be 
some relationship established to the custom and the 
particular claim of negligence under consideration. 
Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 Columbia L. Rev. 
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1147 (1942); Trindle v. Wheeler, 133 P.2d 425 D.C. 
App. Cal. ( 1943). Since this was not done in the 
instant case, this Court is not called upon to con-
sider whether it should accept a position one way 
or the other on the split of authority mistakenly 
analyzed by the trial court. Obviously, the evidence 
was not admissible under either standard. 
In Jenkins v. Hooper, 13 Utah 100, 44 P. 829 
( 1896) , this Court ruled that evidence showing the 
care used by other irrigation companies in cleaning 
their ditches was not admissible to prove that de-
fendants used due care by cleaning their ditch at 
the same time and in the same way. The Comt 
stated: 
"The care and attention which the law re-
quired the defendants to give their ditch, by 
way of cleaning it out or otherwise, could not 
be tested by the amount of care and attention 
given by other companies to others." 
* * * 
"The care or negligence of other men in charge 
of other ditches was not material to the issue 
in this case. The fact that other canals may 
have been cleaned out in the spring afforded 
no reasonable inference as to the alleged negli-
gence of the defendants in issue in this case. 
Nor was such testimony admissible to prove a 
custom, to establish rights and impose duti~s 
in favor of or against persons, natural, arti-
ficial or independent of contract." 
It would appear that this Court has therefore 
reached a determination on at least one prior occa-
sion that testimony of the manner in which other 
persons conduct their activities is not admissible to 
prove negligence or the absence of negligence. How-
ever, if the evidence were admissible foundation was 
required. Further, with reference to the admissibi-
lity of privately established safety codes to reflect 
upon the negligence of a defendant in a particular 
case, the majority rule is stated in 75 A.L.R. 2d 
p. 780: 
'~The majority rule is that evidence of codes 
or standards of safety issued by governmental 
bodies as advisory material, but not having 
the force of law, is not admissible on the issue 
of negligence, * * *" 
It is submitted that the trial court committed 
error in admitting the evidence above referred to 
on the grounds that ( 1) there was an inadequate 
foundation laid to demonstrate that the evidence was 
relevant and material to the issues then before the 
court; ( 2) the evidence related to care or lack of 
care of other individuals but the relationship of the 
activities conducted by other individuals was not 
identified as being similar to those conducted in the 
instant case ; ( 3) the evidence of F. H.A. standards 
was not otherwise admissible, and was not applic-
able to the time in question. It is submitted that the 
41 
admissibility of this evidence could not help but 
have been considered by the jury and therefore 
its receipt was prejudicial error requiring reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants submit that in the instant case, they 
are entiled to a reversal of the judgment imposed 
against them and a order by this Court finding 
that the respondent Brent Wheeler was contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law. The facts of the 
instant case are such that when compared to com-
parable precedent from other states relating to in-
dividuals sustaining comparable injuries it must be 
concluded that Brent Wheeler's contributory negli-
gence was established as a matter of law. Further, 
decisions from this State indicate that in comparable 
situations where an individual has observed a dan-
ger, is aware of its existence and fails to take reas-
onable precaution for his own safety that he will 
be deemed contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law. 
In addition, the court's instructions to the jury 
in failing to appraise them that there was a duty on 
the part of the respondent, Brent Wheeler, to keep 
a reasonable lookout for his own safety, taking into 
consideration possible distraction and his age and 
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the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of the 
accident, was prejudicial error. Finally, the trial 
court's ruling on the admission of evidence was er-
orneous and allowed the jury to consider matters 
irrelevant and immaterial to the issue before them. 
It is respectively submitted that the posture of 
this case compels reversal. This Court should re-
verse. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
ROBERT W. BRANDT, Esq. 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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